dsh-web3

dsh-web3

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An agent-safe EVM wallet for DeepSeek Harness (DSH): an AI agent can check balances, send tokens, sign permits, and pay x402 invoices, while private keys stay encrypted on your machine and never enter the chat.

dsh plugin --profile web add dsh-web3

Then open Settings → Web3 wallet in DSH to create or import a wallet.

Why

Letting a language model move money fails in predictable ways: wrong decimals, a mistyped address, a payment sent twice after a timeout, or a prompt injection that asks for an unlimited approval. dsh-web3 takes that work away from the model and puts guards around what is left:

• The model states intent; the wallet does the exact work. Amounts in human units, recipients by address, ENS, or contact name, token symbols from a curated list — conversions and calldata are deterministic and checked on-chain.
• Prepare → confirm → execute. What the user reviewed is exactly what gets signed; single-use ids, idempotency keys, and a journal written before broadcast make retries safe.
• Layered decisions. A signing policy (allow / ask / deny), hard spending limits and a transfer whitelist, and pre-signing security checks — denylists (OFAC, ScamSniffer, your own), the on-chain sanctions oracle, eth_simulateV1 reconciled against the decoded intent, address-poisoning and drainer-pattern detection. Critical findings refuse outright; high ones always reach a human.
• The agent can only tighten. Loosening a preset or limit, whitelisting, switching a check off, revealing a recovery phrase, or removing an account happens only in the settings panel, confirmed with a PIN.

Packages

Package	What it is
dsh-web3	The DSH bundle: ctx.wallet service, 30 wallet_* model tools, the dsh-web3-wallet skill, and the Web3 wallet settings page
dsh-web3-core	The library: encrypted vault, signing policy and limits, intent decoding, simulation reconciliation, denylist, providers

Security model

1. Keys never leave the vault in plaintext. scrypt + AES-256-GCM at rest; decrypted keys live only in memory and are wiped on lock.
2. Every signature is authorized first by policy, hard limits, and security checks — in that order, each able only to tighten the previous one.
3. Secrets never travel through tool arguments or results. The passphrase resolves from the environment, the macOS Keychain, or the DSH credentials store; backups happen in the settings panel.
4. Everything is audited in an append-only, secret-scanned log.

Known boundary: a program running as your OS user (including an agent with unrestricted shell access) can read the passphrase from the login Keychain and decrypt the key files. Treat dsh-web3 as a hot wallet for small amounts. See SECURITY.md and the design notes.

Development

pnpm install
pnpm run all        # build + typecheck + test

Requires Node.js 20+ and pnpm 10 (corepack enable picks the version from packageManager). See CONTRIBUTING.md for the workflow and release steps.

Documentation

• Plugin README — install, configuration, settings panel, model experience, limitations
• Core README — library API
• Wallet design and payment protocols — design notes (Chinese)
• Changelog

License

MIT