dsh-login

dsh-login

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Adds a login page, user accounts, and per-user conversation isolation to the DeepSeek Harness Web GUI: every visit requires sign-in, ordinary users cannot see each other's conversations, and an admin manages all accounts from inside the GUI.

Login page	User management (设置 → 用户管理)

Compatibility with DSH ≥ 0.1.5-alpha.1 (option A) is released: @islibaodong/dsh-login@0.2.0 on npm. Upstream reworked the /api transport; dsh-login no longer takes it over, and the connection row is re-enabled. The per-user isolation guard ships as a composition primitive (wrapRemoteGateway / createRemoteIsolation, exported from the host bundle) but is not yet boot-verified — composing it over the native typertGateway plus a two-browser sign-off is the remaining step. See Current status → and docs/verify-option-A.md.

2026-09-17: DSH 0.1.6-alpha.1 support is adapted in 0.2.1 (unpublished): the full suite (17 files / 192 tests) is green against the published 0.1.6-alpha.1 builds, and the 0.1.6 user-facing additions (sidebar terminal, unarchive sessions) are in the ordinary-user allow-list. Details: docs/adapt-dsh-0.1.6.md.

2026-09-18: DSH 0.1.6-alpha.2 support is adapted in 0.2.2 (unpublished): the full suite (18 files / 203 tests) is green against the published 0.1.6-alpha.2 builds. The alpha.2 connection/request hook lets dsh-login put an auth wall on the shared /api bridge (apiBridgeAuth, default on — logout now actually revokes /api), and the ordinary surface gains the alpha.2 additions (terminal.retain, the document-preview workspaceFiles/officeToPdf read surface; the new native pluginManager namespace is admin-only). Upstream still has no native multi-user support and no per-role UI gating. Details: docs/adapt-dsh-0.1.6-alpha.2.md.

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Current status — released (option A)

@islibaodong/dsh-login@0.2.0 is released (npm + git tag v0.2.0). Upstream dsh-v0.1.5-alpha.1 (2026-09-08) removed the WebSocket-downlink event carrier and the dsh-host-apiproxy package that this plugin's /api takeover was built on. The adaptation stops taking over /api and composes a per-user layer on the native connection + api-gateway stack instead. The host source is ported and loads against the built 0.1.5 harness; the connection row is re-enabled and the login wall serves the SPA through the upstream connection handshake. The settings-panel client re-home, the dist host rebuild, and the test-suite rewrite are done (17 files / 189 tests green). Deliberately NOT yet boot-verified (needs a real dsh web boot to confirm): the per-user isolation guard composed over the native typertGateway and the two-browser isolation sign-off (see docs/verify-option-A.md §B). See docs/adapt-dsh-0.1.5.md for the status matrix. The one original goal that still cannot be finished is per-role control of third-party UI-plugin features — that is blocked on upstream DSH support (even at 0.1.5 there is no per-identity slot/section filter or per-role plugin activation gate).

Delivered and working

• Login wall + multi-account user management (设置 → 用户管理).
• Capability discovery (GET /api/auth/capabilities, session-authenticated) and quiet read-denials (204 for a no-permission read probe, 403 for writes; toggle via quietDenials), so ordinary-user browsers stop getting "forbidden" walls and retry storms.
• dsh-login's own settings contribution is already per-user: admins see 设置 → 用户管理, ordinary users see 账户 (identity + logout); ordinary users never call the admin API.
• Per-user isolation guard ships as a composition primitive (option A). Under DSH ≥ 0.1.5 the native connection/api-gateway owns /api, so dsh-login's isolation is a REMOTE-layer guard — wrapRemoteGateway + createRemoteIsolation, exported from this package's host bundle and unit/integration-tested (including ownership scoping and admin passthrough). connection ownership + per-user default workspace are re-established on the native stack. The guard itself must be composed over the native typertGateway row at boot (a deployment decision, not a runtime hot-swap — re-providing typertGateway would be a duplicate-service error) and its behavior verified with a two-browser boot; it is not enforced by the shipped patch alone yet. See docs/verify-option-A.md §B.

Known limitation — why per-role control of the whole UI could not ship

• DSH's settings panel renders a single global section list (SettingsRoot → useSections, a HostObservable<readonly SettingsSectionRow[]> with no identity dimension), so a plugin's settings section cannot be shown/hidden per user from inside dsh-login.
• DSH's WebServer route priority is exact-beats-prefix and exposes no pre-routing hook, so a plugin that self-registers exact routes (e.g. @linxin666/dsh-pet serving /api/pet/pets, /api/pet/state, …) cannot be intercepted or silenced per user by dsh-login.
• DSH's client runtime activates every bundled plugin with no per-user activation gate, so an unchanged third-party plugin still fires its mount-time probes for every user.

Waiting for: upstream DSH to expose per-identity slot/section filtering or conditional plugin activation at the client and route layers. Once that exists, per-role feature control (hide without permission / don't render / don't request) can be implemented here on top of the already-shipped capability surface.

The problem it solves

The DSH Web GUI ships with no login — it assumes a single user on localhost. The moment you bind it to 0.0.0.0 (phone access, LAN sharing, a small team), anyone on that network can open your GUI: read every conversation, burn your configured model API keys, even change host settings.

dsh-login turns that exposure into a multi-user deployment:

• 🔐 Login wall — pages, static assets, SPA routes, the API, and WebSockets all require a valid session; unauthenticated visitors are redirected to /login
• 👥 Multiple accounts — the first visit creates the administrator account; further users are added by an admin right inside the GUI, no CLI needed
• 🙈 Conversation isolation — ordinary users see and act on their own conversations only (including their subagents/forks); other users' sessions, messages, and workspaces are invisible; credentials, host settings, and other admin domains are forbidden wholesale
• 🛠 User management — 设置 → 用户管理: last-login time, online session count, reset password, disable, remove; disabling/removing/password-changes immediately revoke that user's live sessions
• 👑 Admin exception — the admin is not isolated: all sessions visible, full configuration access
• 🚪 Logout — every user gets a logout entry in their settings panel
• 🌐 Remote access friendly — reach the GUI through frp/隧道/tunnels or a LAN IP without hand-editing trustedHosts: the /api host-trust fence uses a live set (LAN literals + trustedHosts + auto-learned hosts), and any successful login learns its Host into a persisted whitelist you can manage in 设置 → 用户管理

Quick start

No environment variables, no config edits — three steps:

# 1. Install (web is the profile that boots the Web GUI)
dsh plugin --profile web add github:islibaodong/dsh-login

2. Initialize: restart dsh web and open the GUI — the first visit shows a one-time "create administrator account" page; pick a username and password
3. Add users: sign in as admin → 设置 → 用户管理 → 新建用户

Uninstall:

dsh plugin --profile web remove @islibaodong/dsh-login

Why --profile web? DSH installs plugins per profile directory ($DSH_HOME/profiles/<name>); web is the profile that boots the Web GUI. Use your profile's name if you run a custom one.

FAQ

• Do I have to log in again after restarting DSH? No — login sessions are persisted to <dataDir>/sessions.json (0o600), so an existing cookie keeps working across a process restart (the cookie otherwise lasts 7 days by default). Only an actual log-out, password change, user removal, or TTL expiry invalidates it.
• What can an ordinary user do? Use the chat normally: create/open/continue their own sessions, run subagents, manage their own workspace content. Everything else (other people's sessions, credentials, plugins/presets/host settings, model-key management) is refused.
• Upgrading from the old single-password version? The old single password no longer logs anyone in; the first visit after upgrading bootstraps a fresh administrator account (details in the migration note below).

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Technical details

For contributors, security reviewers, and troubleshooting. You don't need any of this to use the plugin.

What installation does

dsh plugin add reads this package's declared cordis.patch.yml (a bundle patch) and automatically:

• mounts the dsh-login plugin row (config defaults are sensible; distIndex resolves the frontend dist automatically)
• disables the web-runtime row (where dsh-web-app mounts the frontend-static fallback); dsh-login takes over the fallback seat and re-provides the webRuntime service (LAN trust for the /api fence + the DSH_WEB_URL variable)
• keeps the shipped connection row enabled (option A, DSH ≥ 0.1.5): dsh-client-connection owns the /api carrier and browser-session auth; dsh-login composes its login wall (fallback seat) + per-user isolation primitive on top. It ships its own browser bundle dist/client.js for the settings panel only.

Manual installation (alternative)

If you prefer managing the patch file yourself, add these rows to your profile's cordis.patch.yml:

- insert:
    - id: dsh-login
      name: '@islibaodong/dsh-login'
      config:
        password: DSH_LOGIN_PASSWORD   # credential ref name; namespaces the user store (<name>_USERS)
        distIndex: ''                  # empty resolves the frontend dist automatically
        dataDir: ''                    # empty resolves to <DSH_HOME>/.dsh-login (ownership index)
        sessionTtl: 604800             # 7 days (default)
        autoTrustHosts: true          # learn the Host of any successful login into the /api whitelist
        enabled: true                 # set false to disable without uninstalling
        defaultWorkspace: true        # auto-provision a per-user default workspace on first /api access (on by default; toggleable live in 设置-用户管理)
        workspaceRoot: ''             # default-workspace sandbox root; empty => <DSH_HOME>/workspaces
        apiBridgeAuth: true           # require the dsh_session cookie on the shared /api bridge (DSH >= 0.1.6-alpha.2, on by default)

# IMPORTANT: dsh-login takes over the fallback seat, so the web-runtime row
# (which mounts frontend-static) must be disabled. dsh-login re-provides the
# webRuntime service, so the rest of the composition is unaffected.
- id: web-runtime
  disabled: true

The shipped connection row (dsh-client-connection) stays enabled in option A — it owns /api and the browser-session auth. Do not disable it. dsh-login's per-user isolation guard ships as a composition primitive (see /api integration ➜) and must be composed over typertGateway at boot to take effect.

Note: new rows must live under - insert: — a bare top-level row is treated as an override of an existing row and is a silent no-op for new ids; and the disable key is disabled (not disable).

First-time setup flow

1. First visit (no users yet) -> /login shows a "Create administrator account" page (username + password)
2. User picks credentials -> POST /api/auth/setup creates the forced-admin account (scrypt-hashed, stored under the ${password}_USERS credential ref, default DSH_LOGIN_PASSWORD_USERS) and logs it in
3. Subsequent visits -> /login shows the normal username/password login form
4. User management -> admins open 设置 → 用户管理 in the GUI to list (last login/online status), create, disable/enable, remove users and reset passwords (/api/auth/admin/* JSON routes; removing the last admin is refused)
5. Security -> /api/auth/setup returns 403 once any user exists, preventing hijacking

Migration note: the legacy single-password credential (default ref DSH_LOGIN_PASSWORD) no longer logs anyone in. It stays configured but is unused for authentication — the password config key now only namespaces the user store credential ref (${password}_USERS). Upgrading an existing single-password deployment therefore requires the first visit to bootstrap a fresh administrator account.

How it works

Request -> WebServer
  ├─ /login (exact)            -> dsh-login: setup page (if no users) OR login page
  ├─ /api/auth/setup (exact)  -> dsh-login: POST create admin on first use (403 if users exist)
  ├─ /api/auth/login (exact)  -> dsh-login: POST verify {username,password}, set cookie
  ├─ /api/auth/logout (exact) -> dsh-login: POST revoke session, clear cookie
  ├─ /logout (exact)          -> dsh-login: GET same revocation, redirect to /login
  ├─ /api/auth/me (exact)     -> dsh-login: GET current session identity
  ├─ /api/auth/admin/* (exact) -> dsh-login: admin JSON API (users, password, disable, remove)
  ├─ /api/...                 -> native connection + api-remotes/api-gateway (option A):
  │                             browser-session auth, typert REMOTE dispatch, WS streams
  └─ fallback                 -> dsh-login: auth gateway + static files
                                ├─ no valid cookie -> 302 /login
                                └─ valid cookie   -> serveStatic + connection.authorizeIndex

• Cookie: dsh_session, HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict, Path=/
• Session: 32-byte random token (256-bit) with TTL expiry; sessions carry the username and admin flag and are persisted across restarts (/sessions.json, 0o600), so an in-flight SPA keeps working after a process reload instead of turning every /api call into a 401
• Password storage: scrypt hashes (per-user salt) in the DSH credentials system under ${password}_USERS

Multi-user permission model

• Ordinary users are conversation-only. In option A the native connection/api-gateway owns /api and is agent-keyed; per-user isolation is provided by dsh-login's REMOTE-layer guard (wrapRemoteGateway, exported from this package) which — once composed over typertGateway — restricts ordinary users to their own sessions plus lineage children (subagents/forks — ownership follows parentSessionId), and filters workspace views down to owned sessions. Everything else is off limits:
  • physical allow-list: a fixed set of session.*, subagent.*, workspace.*, goal.* methods plus skill.list, host.describe, llm.providers/llm.models and respond; any other wire method is a 403 before it reaches the harness
  • admin-only domains: credentials.*, settings.*, agentPresets.* are forbidden wholesale
  • also forbidden: llm.discoverModels and the privileged host.* directory dialogs (pickDirectory, listDirectory, createDirectory, openPath)
  • workspace-scoped mutations are ownership-guarded by workspaceId: a non-admin may only rename/delete/insertBefore a workspace that holds at least one of their own sessions, and create is confined to their own sandbox (workspaceRoot/<username>) — so they cannot touch other users' workspaces or register a workspace pointing at an arbitrary host directory
  • the physical session.export channel (target in the query string, outside the envelope) is ownership-guarded at the carrier
  • event streams (mux/host WebSocket frames) are filtered by ownership, so other users' traffic never reaches the browser
• Default user workspace (defaultWorkspace, on by default): non-admin users get a per-user isolated default workspace on first /api access — mkdir their sandbox (workspaceRoot/<username>, default <DSH_HOME>/workspaces/<username>) → register it in the durable workspace registry → attach one session (sessions.create({ workspaceId }), the grouping shape) and record its ownership, so the workspace is immediately visible in the user's workspace.list and ready to use. This solves ordinary users being unable to add a workspace on public/FRP deployments (the frontend flow needs the privileged, non-admin-forbidden host.pickDirectory) without loosening that security boundary. Admins can toggle it live from the 设置 → 用户管理 panel's 默认用户工作空间 switch (persisted to <dataDir>/settings.json, effective immediately, no restart); turning it off does not remove existing workspaces. Provisioning is idempotent (once per user per process) and best-effort (failures never fail the triggering request).
• Remote access compat (remoteWebUiCompat, on by default): accommodates @linxin666/dsh-remote-web-ui unchanged. That popular plugin's /remote device-pairing gate 401s non-loopback (public FRP) desktop traffic — the model dialog, history, composer — independently of dsh-login's /api auth. When this flag is on, dsh-login writes remote-web-ui's enabled:true (which is what actually mounts its host routes; without it the server answers nothing and the client fail-closes onto a dead /remote 405 wall) and requirePairingForLan:false (a live, settings-backed flag re-read per request), so non-loopback traffic rides dsh-login's /api channel gated by the dsh_session cookie instead. It also writes publicBaseUrl from the remoteWebUiPublicBaseUrl config when that is set — required for a public FRP/tunnel host so remote-web-ui's Host-header-based /api/pair/* fence trusts the ordinary-user origin (otherwise the browser there gets 403 on /api/pair/status and the client still fail-closes onto /remote). No-op when remote-web-ui is not installed; admins toggle it live from the 设置 → 用户管理 panel's 远程访问兼容 switch (persisted, effective immediately). Note: with remoteWebUiCompat defaulting to on, the pairing barrier is off for every dsh-login + remote-web-ui deployment — intended, since dsh-login's own /api auth still sits in front.
• Capability discovery + quiet denials (quietDenials, on by default): stops the browser-splashing "forbidden" walls that installed UI plugins (task-board, plugin-manager, agentPreset, doctor, …) trigger on an ordinary-user session when they probe /api/* they cannot use. Three layers: (1) GET /api/auth/capabilities returns the authenticated identity's method/domain/UI-plugin surface (ordinary = the USER_ALLOWED allow-list + core plugins; admin = everything), and dsh-login injects a static non-admin baseline into window.__DSH_SESSION__ at index-render time so clients that read it render no unauthorized feature instead of probing; (2) the physical /api layer answers a side-effect-free read probe (credentials.list, a GET on a forbidden path, a QUIET_DENY_METHODS verb) with 204 No Content instead of 403, so the browser does not error/retry; (3) side-effecting writes keep 403 unchanged. Authorization is never loosened — only the shape of a denied read is quieter. Admins can flip quietDenials off to restore plain 403 everywhere.
• /api bridge auth wall (apiBridgeAuth, on by default; DSH ≥ 0.1.6-alpha.2): on the upstream connection/request hook dsh-login answers 401 for any bridged /api request without a live dsh_session — so logout/expiry/revocation actually cut /api access even though the browser keeps the connection row's process-wide browser-auth cookie. Plugin-exact routes (/api/auth/*, remote-web-ui's /api/pair/* pairing) never touch the bridge and keep working pre-login; the stream-mux WebSocket upgrade stays fenced by the upstream Host/Origin + browser-auth fence (no per-request hook exists there). Turn it off only if you serve the bridge to clients that cannot carry the dsh_session cookie — e.g. remote-web-ui's /remote paired-device channel re-issues requests server-side without it (pairing is by design a full-control credential outside dsh-login's user model). On DSH < 0.1.6-alpha.2 the hook does not exist and this is a harmless no-op.
• Admin sees and does everything: unfiltered API access, all sessions/workspaces visible, and the 设置 → 用户管理 settings section.
• Logout: the settings panel's 用户管理/账户 section carries a logout entry for every user (POST /api/auth/logout → /login); GET /logout works as a plain link.
• Admin user management (设置 → 用户管理): ships inside the GUI settings panel via the browser bundle — no separate page. Inside it, the Allowed Hosts / Trusted Hosts card lists the /api whitelist (learned + manually added) with add/remove — removing takes effect immediately. A 默认用户工作空间 switch toggles the per-user default-workspace provisioning live (persisted, no restart), and a 远程访问兼容 switch toggles the remote-web-ui requirePairingForLan bypass. The user list reports each account's last-login time (stamped on every successful login; never before its first login after the feature shipped), online session count, and disabled flag; per-row actions reset passwords, disable/enable, and remove users (single non-wrapping line, right-aligned). Ordinary users get an 账户 section (identity + logout). The panel styles itself entirely through the framework's --dsw-alias-* theme tokens, so it follows the app skin (light/dark) automatically.

Data locations

Data	Location
User accounts (scrypt hashes)	DSH credentials system, ref ${password}_USERS (default DSH_LOGIN_PASSWORD_USERS)
Session→user ownership sidecar	<DSH_HOME>/.dsh-login/ownership.json (configurable via dataDir; DSH_HOME env or ~/.dsh)
Auto-learned / admin Host whitelist	<DSH_HOME>/.dsh-login/trusted-hosts.json (configurable via dataDir)
Default-user-workspace toggle	<DSH_HOME>/.dsh-login/settings.json (configurable via dataDir)
Remote-web-ui compat toggle	<DSH_HOME>/.dsh-login/settings-remote-web-ui.json (configurable via dataDir)
Login sessions	<DSH_HOME>/.dsh-login/sessions.json (0o600; persisted across restarts, TTL drops stale)

/api integration (option A, DSH ≥ 0.1.5-alpha.1)

For DSH ≥ 0.1.5-alpha.1 dsh-login no longer takes over the /api carrier: cordis.patch.yml leaves the shipped connection row enabled, so dsh-client-connection + api-remotes / api-gateway own the /api transport and the live Remote streams. dsh-login composes its per-user layer on top of that native stack (see docs/adapt-dsh-0.1.5.md and the verification checklist docs/verify-option-A.md): fallback login wall + static serving through the native serveStatic, plus connection.authorizeIndex on index responses so the browser receives its upstream /api cookie. The old src/connection.ts carrier takeover and its dist/client.js re-stamp were removed with the dsh-host-apiproxy-based per-user ApiProxy. The per-user conversation / workspace isolation is re-homed as a REMOTE-layer guard — wrapRemoteGateway + createRemoteIsolation, exported from this package's host bundle and unit/integration-tested — which a deployment composes over the native typertGateway at boot. Composition + two-browser behavioral sign-off is the remaining, boot-bound step (see docs/verify-option-A.md §B).

Host trust is evaluated live per request. The /api fence uses a deduped effective set — LAN literals from the web runtime + trustedHosts + the persisted whitelist (src/hosts.ts). A successful login/setup auto-learns the request Host (gated by autoTrustHosts, default true), so a public host reached through frp/隧道/tunnels is trusted after one login; learned hosts bind immediately and removals apply without a restart.

Security notes

Protected by the gateway

Asset	Protection
Page navigation (/)	302 redirect to /login if unauthenticated
Static assets (/assets/*.js, .css, etc.)	Same gateway check
SPA routes (/conversations, /settings, etc.)	Same gateway check

Protected by the carrier takeover

Asset	Protection
API requests (/api/*)	isTrustedApiRequest host trust and a valid dsh_session cookie (401 without one); non-allowed methods 403 for ordinary users
WebSocket (/api/events.mux, /api/events.host)	Same host-trust + cookie checks on upgrade; frames ownership-filtered per user

Recommendations for public exposure

1. With autoTrustHosts on (default), any successful login learns its Host into the whitelist (/api/auth/admin/hosts, manageable in 设置 → 用户管理), so an frp/tunnel host is trusted after one login — no trustedHosts editing needed. Keep it on unless you want only loopback + an explicit trustedHosts set to be accepted.
2. Use a reverse proxy (nginx/caddy) with TLS termination in front of DSH.
3. The gateway cookie is SameSite=Strict, protecting against CSRF on the login/logout endpoints.

Troubleshooting: a non-admin user "cannot add a workspace" over a public tunnel?

Diagnosis quick reference: this is almost never the host whitelist (autoTrustHosts already learns the public host and login succeeds). The real blocker is that ordinary users are denied the privileged directory picker host.pickDirectory by design (api-filter.ts deliberately 403s it for non-admin users, together with listDirectory/createDirectory/openPath). The frontend's add-workspace flow must call pickDirectory to choose a host directory, so non-admins get stuck — e.g. transport failure for /api/host.pickDirectory: HTTP 403.

• This is isolation-by-design, not a broken deployment. Do not "fix" it by allowing host.pickDirectory for ordinary users (that would let them browse/choose arbitrary host directories and break multi-user isolation).
• The correct fix is this plugin's default user workspace (defaultWorkspace, on by default): a non-admin's first /api access auto-provisions a per-username-isolated sandbox workspace (with a starter session, immediately visible in workspace.list and usable), entirely bypassing the blocked picker. Admins toggle it live from the 设置 → 用户管理 panel's 默认用户工作空间 switch.
• If autoTrustHosts is on, public login works, yet /api still 403s, it is almost certainly this pickDirectory method-level permission rather than the trust fence.

Architecture note: fallback vs prefix /

The gateway uses registerFallback() (not register({ kind: 'prefix', path: '/' })) because the DSH WebServer's prefix matching checks pathname.startsWith(prefix + '/'). For prefix /, this becomes //, which no normal path starts with -- a prefix / route only matches the exact path /. The fallback handler catches everything no named route claims, which is the correct catch-all behavior for the authentication gateway.

The WebServer has a single fallback seat. dsh-web-app's web-runtime row mounts frontend-static over it unconditionally, so the web-runtime row must be disabled when using dsh-login; dsh-login re-provides the webRuntime service that row owned (LAN trust, DSH_WEB_URL), leaving the rest of the composition intact.

Running tests

# Canonical full suite (203 tests, green under option A against DSH 0.1.5-alpha.1 through 0.1.6-alpha.2; requires the DSH checkout for package
# resolution — set DSH_HARNESS_CHECKOUT or run beside the default path)
npx vitest run

The .spec.ts files are the canonical vitest definitions, including the pure/multi-user-adjacent suites (users, ownership, hosts, admin-api, session, gateway, capabilities, remote-web-ui-compat, client-bundle, settings-panel, plugin-entry, …). The connection / api-filter / multiuser-e2e specs were removed in the option-A adaptation (they tested the deleted dsh-host-apiproxy /api takeover); the REMOTE-layer isolation guard is covered by tests/remote-guard.spec.ts (ownership scoping, admin passthrough, array/nested id-arg ownership). tests/runner.mjs and tests/integration-runner.mjs are sandbox-compatible harnesses for the original single-password core only; they were not extended for the multi-user feature. The live two-browser isolation sign-off (§B of docs/verify-option-A.md) still requires a booted deployment.

Project structure

src/
├── index.ts          # Cordis plugin entry: registers auth routes, fallback login gateway, webRuntime
├── config.ts         # schemastery config schema (password, distIndex, dataDir, sessionTtl, ...)
├── users.ts          # UserStore: user records, scrypt hashing, credentials-backed persistence
├── session.ts        # SessionStore: sessions (user + admin flag) with TTL expiry, persisted across restarts
├── ownership.ts      # OwnershipIndex: sessionId → username sidecar (debounced JSON file)
├── hosts.ts          # TrustedHosts: trusted-host whitelist (live set + debounced JSON persistence)
├── api-filter.ts     # pure predicates (AuthUser/USER_ALLOWED/isUserAllowed) for the per-user admission seam
├── settings-panel.client.js  # settings-panel browser half (plain JS): 用户管理/账户 section, theme-token styled
├── workspace-setting.ts  # 默认用户工作空间 runtime toggle (extends BooleanSetting)
├── boolean-setting.ts  # live + persisted {enabled} runtime flag shared by admin switches
├── remote-web-ui-compat.ts  # writes remote-web-ui's enabled+requirePairingForLan+publicBaseUrl (settings-backed, live) to mount its routes & bypass pairing / trust the public host
├── capabilities.ts  # capability discovery (deriveCapabilities) + read-probe classifier (isReadProbe/QUIET_DENY_METHODS)
├── admin-api.ts      # /api/auth/me + /api/auth/capabilities + /api/auth/admin/* JSON routes (settings-panel backend)
├── auth.ts           # Cookie management + constant-time compare helpers
├── gateway.ts        # Auth gateway fallback (login wall + serveStatic + upstream connection.authorizeIndex)
├── login-api.ts      # POST /api/auth/login + logout + setup
├── login-page.ts     # Login and setup page HTML
├── http-json.ts      # readBody/sendJson helpers + resolveDshHome
├── remote-guard.ts   # REMOTE-layer per-user isolation guard (wrapRemoteGateway + createRemoteIsolation), exported from the host bundle
└── web-runtime.ts    # webRuntime takeover: LAN trust + DSH_WEB_URL
tests/ (option-A suite: 17 files / 189 tests green)
└── *.spec.ts         # vitest test definitions

License

MIT